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In his seminal paper, Gabrielsson (2002) distinguishes between emotion felt by the
listener, here: “internal locus of emotion” (IL), and the emotion the music is expressing,
here: “external locus of emotion” (EL). This paper tabulates 16 comparisons of felt
versus expressed emotions in music published in the decade 2003–2012 consisting of
19 studies/experiments and provides some theoretical perspectives. The key findings
were that (1) IL rating was frequently rated statistically the same or lower than the
corresponding EL rating (e.g., lower felt happiness rating compared to the apparent
happiness of the music), and that (2) self-select and preferred music had a smaller gap
across the emotion loci than experimenter-selected and disliked music. These key findings
were explained by an “inhibited” emotional contagion mechanism, where the otherwise
matching felt emotion may have been attenuated by some other factor such as social
context. Matching between EL and IL for loved and self-selected pieces was explained by
the activation of “contagion” circuits. Physiological arousal, personality and age, as well
as musical features (tempo, mode, putative emotions) also influenced perceived and felt
emotion distinctions. A variety of data collection formats were identified, but mostly using
rating items. In conclusion, a more systematic use of terminology appears desirable. Two
broad categories, namely matched and unmatched, are proposed as being sufficient to
capture the relationships between EL and IL, instead of four categories as suggested by
Gabrielsson.
Keywords: expressed and felt emotion in music, emotion locus, contagion, normative dissociation, contrast effect,
affect valence, literature review
The distinction between emotion felt by a listener (internal locus
of emotion) and emotion expressed by a piece of music (exter-
nal locus of emotion) has become a firmly established part of
research agenda of music psychologists in the last decade. Since
the seminal work of Gabrielsson (2002) we have seen evidence
that emotion felt in response to music (e.g., “the music makes
me feel happy”) is sometimes the same as (“the music is happy”)
and sometimes different from (“the music is sad”) the emo-
tion expressed by the music—so called “perceived emotion.” This
paper aims to push the debate further by examining the data in
the literature published in the decade after Gabrielsson (2002)
and explaining why the emotions between the two loci (felt
vs. expressed) are sometimes systematically different and some-
times the same. The paper is structured as follows. First, (1) the
inclusion criteria and limitations of the review are laid out, (2)
some early music psychology research related to emotion locus
is presented including an overview of Gabrielsson’s paper, fol-
lowed by (3) a collation of the target literature of this review.
Then, (4) the theoretical implications of the literature are dis-
cussed, with (5) a proposed reworking of Gabrielsson’s locus
relationships to accommodate a developed understanding, and
to highlight some of the key research questions emerging in the
field.
INCLUSION CRITERIA AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS REVIEW
INCLUSION CRITERIA
The inclusion criteria for the research tabulated for the review are
as follows: (1) studies which made a direct comparison between
external locus emotion and internal locus emotion in connection
with music listening; (2) studies which use the same response
regime for both external locus and internal responses; and (3)
studies appearing in peer-reviewed journals in the 10-year period
of 2003–2012 (that is, the decade since Gabrielsson’s publication).
Nineteen studies met all three criteria. The reason for excluding
studies that have some connection with emotion locus and music
are now explained.
LIMITATION 1: EXPRESSED AND FELT EMOTION DATA COMPATIBILITY
When discussion of locus is presented in the research literature
on emotion in music, it is most frequently an acknowledgment
that a locus distinction exists, but that the study limits the inves-
tigation to one locus or the other (internal or external), without
comparing both. Sometimes the data in each locus are not directly
comparable (e.g., a rating of felt emotion, but a categorical, a pri-
ori label for the emotion expressed by the stimulus), as will be
discussed below. Such studies were not included in the tabulated
literature of this review.
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Thus, studies that could allow comparison of locus by rating
of expressed emotion a priori (e.g., by a panel of experts, as in
numerous mood induction studies), or comparison of physio-
logical measures with one locus or the other (e.g., Krumhansl,
1997; Grewe et al., 2007; Nagel et al., 2007; for a critical review,
see Konecˇni, 2008; Grewe et al., 2009, pp. 263–265) were not
included. The bulk of the a priori rated expressed locus data are
found in the well-established music mood induction literature1.
LIMITATION 2: TERMINOLOGY TO DESCRIBE THE FELT/EXPRESSED
DISTINCTION
As discussed below, the terminology to describe locus of emotion
is varied, making online keyword searching alone inappropriate
for locating articles that fulfill the inclusion criteria 2. Instead,
a number of sources and databases were consulted—Google
Scholar, PsycINFO, Scopus, and Web of Knowledge, as well as
papers that cited Gabrielsson’s (2002) paper.
LIMITATION 3: EMOTION LOCUS RESEARCH IN NON-MUSIC RESEARCH
Although an interest in comparing locus in other fields of research
can be found—for example, in social reception (e.g., Jakobs et al.,
2001; Bombari et al., 2013), cross-modal (e.g., Calder et al.,
2000), film (e.g., Matsumoto and Kupperbusch, 2001; Wang and
Cheong, 2006; Werner et al., 2007), literature (e.g., Oatley, 1995;
Green, 2004; Miall, 2011), business (e.g., Pugh, 2001), and facial
expression of emotion (e.g., Dimberg et al., 2000; Barthomeuf
et al., 2012; Sato et al., 2013) research—it appears that most
interest in the direct comparison of internal with external loci
of emotion via empirical means is rooted in music perception
research, making the transference of findings from other sub-
disciplines limited at this point in time. However, some relevant
issues from non-music studies are mentioned in this review.
LIMITATION 4: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND MOOD INDUCTION
The review is limited to empirical data from music psychology
research in which data from each emotion locus (felt by listener
and expressed by music) are gathered and compared. It should
be noted that music psychology has been influenced by ideas
about emotion locus that were primarily in the realm of philos-
ophy and aesthetics. It is those scholars who introduced terms
of emotivism and cognitivism, often quoted in the music psy-
chology literature (Baumgartner, 1992; Goldman, 1995; Scherer
and Zentner, 2001; Rickard, 2004; Schubert, 2007a; Konecˇni,
1Music is used in clinical and laboratory settings to inducemood. For a review,
see Vastfjall (2001). When music is selected for such mood induction, it is
inferred that the music will affect the listener because the music is expressing
the corresponding emotion. This is borne out by some of the studies in mood
induction used in fields of research such as music therapy. Although there
is a substantial literature that documents these effects (e.g., Kenealy, 1988;
Thaut and De L’etoile, 1993; Gendolla and Kruesken, 2001; Kreutz et al., 2002;
Larcom and Isaacowitz, 2009; Harkness et al., 2010; Dyck et al., 2011), these
research outputs are not reviewed here because the participant is not rating
the emotion the music expresses, but (when required to) the way the music
makes them feel.
2This issue and the relatively small number of comparable studies made it
difficult to sufficiently fulfill the “Checklist of items to include when report-
ing a systematic review or meta-analysis” proposed by Moher et al. (2009).
Relevant details (mean, SD and N) for this review are nevertheless tabulated
when available.
2008; Konecˇni et al., 2008; Roy et al., 2008, 2009; Coutinho and
Cangelosi, 2009; Lundqvist et al., 2009; Garrido and Schubert,
2011b; Hoeckner et al., 2011; Panagiotidi and Samartzi, 2012).
However, I do not focus on these philosophical writings not just
because they fall outside the “empirical research” gamut, but
because they generally have a different focus from that of music
psychology: where music psychologists seek to understand the
nature and relationship between emotion loci in music, philoso-
phers of aesthetics are frequently concerned with identifying the
value of music that evokes emotion (the emotivist perspective)
vs. expresses emotion (the cognitivist perspective). For exam-
ple, Scruton (1983) writes, “To describe a piece of music as
expressive of melancholy is to give reason for listening to it;
to describe it as arousing of evoking melancholy is to give a
reason for avoiding it” (p. 49), and (Kivy, 1989) “one substan-
tial group of listeners who report that sad music makes them
sad are simply (and understandably) mistaken” (p. 163). This
value perspective has relevance in music psychology, particularly
when value is operationalized as a variable such as liking (some
empirical research has provided evidence supporting the spirit of
the just cited statements—see, e.g., Konecˇni et al., 2008; Hunter
et al., 2010; Vuoskoski and Eerola, 2012); however, the litera-
ture review is limited to understanding the relationships between
emotion loci from the perspective of listener self-reports (rather
than judging the value of the music). Outside such circum-
stances, the more purely philosophical research will be used to
inform the reviewed material, rather than be part of it. Hence,
a limitation of the present review will be to examine exclusively
music-psychology literature (for excellent aesthetician accounts,
see Radford, 1989; Kivy, 1990, 1999, 2002; Davies, 1994, 2003;
Robinson, 1994).
LIMITATION 5: WITHIN-LOCUS DISTINCTIONS
On a related matter, this review will not attempt to separate
“within emotion locus” distinctions, such as the internal locus
distinction between inducing mood vs. feeling an emotion (e.g.,
Weld, 1912; Diener et al., 1995; Lychner, 1998; Gray et al., 2001;
Sloboda and Juslin, 2010). Another within-internal-locus distinc-
tion is between “truly,” internally felt emotion vs. the emotion one
displays in an intrapersonal, social, or work setting. This kind of
distinction is covered in non-music research on emotional regu-
lation, which includes protective buffering (Langer et al., 2007;
Manne et al., 2007), display rules (Ekman, 1972; Matsumoto,
1990), and emotional dissonance and emotional labor (Bono and
Vey, 2005; Mann, 2005; Bakker and Heuven, 2006). Such distinc-
tions within internal locus are not reported here because they
have not been cited in empirical music perception investigations
that meet the inclusion criteria, and do not at first seem to be
of relevance because one would imagine that knowing how to
behave in front of a piece of music is not relevant in the way
that knowing how to behave in front of other people is rele-
vant. That is, it seems unlikely that we would need to distinguish
between how we actually feel and the felt emotion that we display
(for example, through facial, bodily or written/typed response)
in the study of emotion in music. Although this internal locus
distinction is not covered in the empirical data of the literature
reviewed, it will be relevant in future research (for a discussion in
non-music contexts, see Gross et al., 2000).
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Within-external locus distinctions, such as whether music is
portraying emotion, expressing emotion, trying to portray/express
emotion, or “is” emotional (the music is sad), are also not cov-
ered in this review, again because empirical data investigating
these distinctions are rare and mostly concerned with seman-
tics. Instead, in this review, the terminology used to discriminate
external and internal locus (rather than its semantic/linguistic
utility) is reported (see subsection “Locus Terminology”, below),
with the exception of one study that is included (Van Zijl and
Sloboda, 2011) because it raises the matter of the “performer”
locus of emotion, which is external from the listener perspec-
tive unless the listener is the performer. Again, future empirical
studies will be needed to examine the various external locus
possibilities, specifically the emotion that the composer(s), per-
former(s) or other (perhaps imaginary) listener(s) are thought to
be experiencing (according to the perceiver), and whether a fur-
ther distinction between these other people and the music should
be made when considering external locus. For example, some
recent research has considered emotion ratings that others would
make about a piece of music as a way of managing possible bias
in external locus response. That is, instead of being asked what
emotion they believe the music expresses, a participant is asked,
“How would normal people feel when listening to this musical
stimulus?” (Kawakami et al., 2013).
PREVIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS LEADING UP TO
GABRIELSSON’S PUBLICATION
Pre-review period (before 2003) accounts by music psychologists
demonstrating an awareness of the distinction between felt and
expressed emotion are frequent (e.g., Weld, 1912; Valentine, 1962,
p. 10; Swanwick, 1975; Payne, 1980; Thayer, 1986; Gaver and
Mandler, 1987; Frances, 1988, p. 243; Sloboda, 1992; Scherer and
Zentner, 2001; for a discussion of key pre-review period studies,
of course see Gabrielsson (2002) but in particular pp. 124–127
and pp. 132–133), but almost none of these explicitly compare
locus responses empirically (exceptions among which are Lee,
1932; Collins, 1989; Zentner, 2000).
From a historical point of view, and from a theory-building
perspective, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the pioneering
study by Lee (1932). A questionnaire was developed to inves-
tigate responses to music made by music lovers, to tease out
the role of emotion (among other things) reported by partici-
pants, and to identify any skepticism about whether music was
capable of stimulating human expression and emotion. Over 100
responses were collected, spanning a period ofmore than 25 years.
One part of the analysis was to classify “listeners” who had aes-
thetic interest in music and “hearers” who were more focused on
human-emotional interests in music listening. Lee asked explic-
itly about locus, but upon analysis she noticed that participants
treated the three options of the questions as “one of three” rather
than two of three (A or B—internal locus, and then C—external
locus):
(A) Does music put you into emotional conditions (or moods)
different from the one you happen to be in? or
(B) Does it merely intensify already existing moods?
(C) Do you merely recognize, without participating, that music
represents varieties of human emotion and mood? (p. 202)
Lee’s openness and regret are explicit as she acknowledges:
What I wanted to know was whether the Answerer merely recog-
nised that a given piece of music had (i.e., might be described as
having) a given emotional character, e.g., was sad or cheerful, or
whether hearing that piece of music made him feel sad or cheer-
ful when he had not been so before? This fairly simple query,
clearly worded as “do you merely recognize without participation
that music represents varieties of human emotion and mood?” was
the real subject under examination and ought therefore to have
been put first and foremost. Instead of that, and from a mistaken
hope of additional clearness, it was put after the queries (intended
to be supplementary to it) whether the Answerer’s already exist-
ing mood could be altered or whether that mood was merely
intensified by the emotion which was not merely recognized as
characterizing the music, but actually participated in when hear-
ing that music. As a result of this strategical blunder, the majority
of Answerers did not notice the main question of Participation
versus Recognition. (p. 203, italics in original)
Nevertheless, Lee identified participants who explicitly reported
the link between felt and expressed emotion; for example, two
participants, Bob and Lewis, respectively, wrote:
“Music generally substitutes newmoods and emotions: if the emo-
tion is tragic or tender, it seems that my mood becomes tragic
or tender.” (This is recognition producing a sort of sympathetic
imitation.)
[. . .]
“It is not that the music expressed one’s own feelings, but that
the feelings or mood which the music expresses awaken these
very feelings in oneself. Music never intensifies existing feelings,
it either awakens feelings which I haven’t got or merely represents
them.” (p. 204, Lee’s annotation of Bob’s comment is shown in the
parenthetical)
Hence, Lee’s work appears to be the first explicit attempt in
English language music psychology research to collect empirical
data on the distinction between locus of emotion, a pioneering
effort that has received regrettably little attention in subsequent
research. Her explanation of “sympathetic imitation” will be
highly relevant in the theory development of this review. Aside
from the data and analysis reported by Lee, it was not until
2002 when Gabrielsson acknowledged in explicit terms the pos-
sible relationships between loci (Gabrielsson is also an important
researcher, as was Lee, in compiling a large body of data on
individuals’ self-reported aesthetic/emotional reactions to music:
Gabrielsson, 2011).
Gabrielsson’s (2002) publication was noticed and paved the
way for a new era of research, by laying out the possible relation-
ships between felt and expressed emotions. Gabrielsson provided
a cautious, broad definition of emotion, which is used as a starting
point in the present review: “Not to get trapped in . . . termino-
logical confusion already from the beginning, I will use ‘emotion’
and ‘feeling’ in a generic and broad-minded sense, often involv-
ing cognitive components; “mood” and “affect” will be used when
employed by authors referred to in the text” (p. 123–124). He
then presented a detailed argument explaining that participants
can only logically make distinctions between felt and perceived
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emotion in music through verbal report, as distinct from, say,
physiological measurement.
Gabrielsson discusses some of the reasons for the absence of
direct emotion locus comparisons inmusic perception. For exam-
ple, he recounts the belief that there were different listener types,
some who focused on the music, and others who focused on their
own feelings when listening to music (Lee, discussed above, pro-
vides a case in point). Music was seen by many researchers and lay
people as “an object for perception and reflection” and the emo-
tional response as a listener’s reaction. As a result, Gabrielsson
concluded that the distinction between emotion loci in music
“is not always clearly observed, neither in everyday conversation
about emotions, nor in scientific papers” (Gabrielsson, 2002, p.
124). Another reason for the neglect is the influence of aestheti-
cians upon music psychologists, as mentioned in Limitation 4,
above, where the interest was in whether music that expresses
emotion should be more valued than music that evokes emo-
tion in the listener. This perspective suggests that each locus has a
distinct aesthetic function, providing one reason why researchers
have been distracted from the psychological relationships between
the emotion loci.
According to Gabrielsson, in broad terms, felt and expressed
emotions could be related through a “positive” relationship (felt
emotion is the same as expressed emotion—feeling sad when
hearing sad music), or it could be “negative” (i.e., opposite, e.g.,
feeling angry when hearing happy music). Furthermore, felt and
expressed emotions could exhibit “no systematic relationship”
(e.g., feeling various emotions when hearing calmmusic), or have
no relationship at all (such as feeling no emotion, or identifying
no emotion in the music). Gabrielsson traces back the presence
of positive relationships to the ancient Greeks where music was
thought to be able to directly affect the listener, in a manner sim-
ilar to more contemporary research on mood management and
regulation theory (Knobloch and Zillmann, 2002; Saarikallio and
Erkkilä, 2007; Wilhelm et al., 2013), through a process that would
later be called contagion by Juslin and Västfjäll (2008). That is,
contagion explains how music can express an emotion that then
“infects” its listener.
Opposite relationships, Gabrielsson explains, and is confirmed
by subsequent research, are more idiosyncratic (e.g., when an
event of a contrary emotion happens in one’s life that becomes
associated with music heard at the same time), or a sad piece of
music makes the listener happy because it is relaxing, cathartic
and pleasurable (Schubert, 1996; Matsumoto, 2002; Huron, 2011;
Vuoskoski and Eerola, 2012; Vuoskoski et al., 2012; Schubert,
2013), or the listener, perhaps in attempting to improve mood,
actually makes their mood worse, perhaps due to some com-
plicating circumstances such as a mood disorder (Garrido and
Schubert, 2011b, 2013).
In the case of no systematic relationship, the listener might
not be affected by the music at all, but be able to observe the
music as expressing some emotion—Gabrielsson characterizes
this with the “analytic listener”—or that different emotions are
evoked in the listener at different occasions—the “zero correla-
tion” relationship. The final category, of “no relationship at all,” is
characterized by the absence or unreliable presence of emotions
in one or both loci, such as the internal locus (human) emotions
as identified by Scherer and Zentner (2001) that music cannot
express with reasonable agreement, which is likely to include grat-
itude, fascination, disgust, jealousy, safety, warmth and humility.
Gabrielsson’s relationships are not intended as clear-cut, and
polychotomous: The differentiation between internal and exter-
nal locus can be blurred, and the experience felt vs. the perceived
emotion in the music may not even be distinguishable or mean-
ingful to some. Gabrielsson writes, “We may think of them as
opposite extremes on a continuum from ‘pure’ emotion-free per-
ception at the one end to intense emotional reaction at the other
end. Rather than being at any of these extremes, in most situ-
ations listeners are probably somewhere along this continuum,
depending on many circumstances” (p. 124).
In the years following Gabrielsson’s influential paper, research
on explicitly collected self-report felt and expressed emotion in
music grew, and 16 peer-reviewed publications that met the
inclusion criteria were located. Some of the publications reported
more than one study that was concerned with emotion locus and
music, and two reported locus data from previously published
sources (Schubert, 2007a; Ilie and Thompson, 2011), bringing the
total number of included, unique data sets (studies) comparing
emotionloci inmusicto19.Fifteenofthestudieswereexperimental
(Schubert, 2007a is not added to this count because it is a reanalysis
of Schubert, 2007b), three were survey based (no music played),
and one was a qualitative study (Van Zijl and Sloboda, 2011).
REVIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE:
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A summary of the included studies is tabulated in
Supplementary Table 1. The reviewed papers are discussed
according to terminologies and methodologies, followed by key
results.
LOCUS TERMINOLOGY
The labels used to denote internal and external locus varied con-
siderably across the tabulated studies. Naming the locus variable
produced several alternatives: instruction condition (Vieillard
et al., 2008: “instructed to report own emotion or instructed to
describe the music”), “response” (Hunter et al., 2010), “mode”
(Dibben, 2004), “modality” (Zentner et al., 2008), “type of rat-
ing” (Ali and Peynirciogˇlu, 2010), “point of view” (Kallinen and
Ravaja, 2006), and “locus” (Schubert, 2007b).
The labeling of each of the two levels of the variable demon-
strates a rich variety of ways of understanding the phenom-
ena in question. Lee’s pairing (“participate” for internal locus
and “recognize” for external) is absent in all the contempo-
rary literature reviewed, although Vieillard et al. (2008) use the
term “recognize” in their recognized-experienced level labels.
Collins (1989)—not part of the tabulated review—provides a
rather detailed distinction between internal and external loci:
“own emotional response—emotional content of the music” and
“describe music—describe human emotion,” as do Kallinen and
Ravaja in asking their participants to respond to the music from
two different “points of view”:
Participants were first asked to evaluate the emotions the music
aroused in them during listening (i.e., emotion felt; “How did
you feel when you listened [to] the music?”), and second, evaluate
the emotional quality of the music regardless of the experiences
it aroused in them (i.e., emotion perceived; “What is the [more
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objective] emotional nature of music, regardless of your personal
reactions to it?”). (Kallinen and Ravaja, 2006, p. 200)
Other variants were expressed-felt (Dibben, 2004); perceiving-
feeling (Hunter et al., 2010); expressed-induced (Zentner et al.,
2008); perception-induction; perceive-experience (Juslin and
Laukka, 2004); conveyed-elicited (Ali and Peynirciogˇlu, 2010);
and participant believed the composer was intending to convey—
felt in response to the musical excerpt (Salimpoor et al., 2009).
Van Zijl and Sloboda (2011) refer tomusical emotion—own emo-
tion. This study is interesting from the perspective that it tracks
the responses of the listeners who are also the performers of the
music. Such an approach may be incorporated into the “locus”
nomenclature used by Schubert, by extending the meaning of
external locus beyond the “perspective” of the listener. That is,
if the listener is asked to judge the emotion that the performer
is experiencing while playing, or the emotion the composer was
experiencing while composing, or even the emotion experienced
by any other listener (or an imagined agent), the locus would
still be external, but focussed on another person, rather than on
the music (a detailed investigation of the appreciation of the per-
former/composer emotion is beyond the scope of this review, but
see, for example, Juslin, 2000; Juslin et al., 2001; Kreutz et al.,
2008b).
In summary, no single pair of designations for each locus level
was used consistently across the studies. This reflects a richness
in the descriptions, subtle distinctions, but also lack of system-
atic classification. The recommendation of this review is to label
two levels of the variable as deemed appropriate in each study:
felt, induced (although this may be related to mood according to
some researchers), evoked, internal locus vs. expressed, portrayed,
“in the music,” and external locus. “Perceived” is frequently used
to describe external locus, however, the term could be confused
because a participant can perceive many things, including their
own feelings in some cases (Konecˇni, 2008). Context and gram-
mar is important here: to make the locus distinction clear from
the listener’s perspective, and when the listener is the subject of the
sentence, she or he feels an emotion, but perceives it (rather than
expresses it) in the music—“express” does not designate exter-
nal locus when the listener is the subject of the sentence (“the
listener expresses happiness”). When the music is the subject of
the sentence, expressed emotion is the external locus designation
(obviously not “perceived,” because music is not an agent that can
literally perceive).
Using the term “locus” to describe the variable frees up labels
that are commonly used to describe other variables, such as type
and mode. “Perspective” is another possible term that could be
used to describe the variable but was not cited with any regularity
in the tabulated literature.
Table 1 attempts to organize all of the terms used to describe
each of the two levels of loci located in the literature. It should be
understood, then, that the unambiguous use of the terminology
depends on the explicit and implied grammatical subject (that
is, if stated from the perspective of the listener or of the music).
Any of the internal-external pairings are satisfactory but need to
have the subject (music or listener) explicitly stated or made clear.
The term “communicates” is listed under internal locus from
the music perspective because it suggests a context: “the music
Table 1 | Terminology of emotion locus levels by grammatical subject
(perspective).
Locus Listener perspective Music perspective
Internal Felt, experienced, self,
own, reactivity
Conveys, induces, evokes,
arouses, elicits, (communicates)
External Perceived, recognized,
sensed, noticed
Expresses, portrays, depicts,
conveys, sounds, describes, has
character, “is”
communicates to me.” But since the term “communication” refers
to the transmission of information from one source to another, it
may lead to some ambiguity (e.g., “the music is communicating
an emotion”—external locus?).
PARTICIPANTS
All included experimental studies in this review had over 25
participants in each experiment, with the Konecˇni et al. (2008)
study having 144 participants. The two questionnaire-based
studies had 262 (Zentner et al., 2008) and 141 (Juslin and Laukka,
2004) participants. The open-ended study of the musicians’
perspectives used 8 performers covering a variety of musical
instruments (Van Zijl and Sloboda, 2011). Participants had a
range of ages across studies, with one study examining results of
older participants separately (Schubert, 2007b; Experiment 3). A
wide range of musical experiences were reported, though none
of the studies treated musical experience (e.g., high vs. low) as an
experimental variable.
TYPES OF MUSIC USED
The bulk of music used in the studies tabulated comes from the
common practice period (CPP) of Western art music, which is
sometimes referred to as “classical” music. Twelve publications
using experimenter-selected pieces used exclusively such music.
Classical music, and in particular music from the romantic art
music period, is considered particularly good for expressing and
evoking emotions (Romantic(ism), 2013).
Since studies by Panksepp (1995), Blood and Zatorre (2001),
and Rickard (2004), it has become evident that another effec-
tive way to evoke strong emotional responses is to use music
that the participant, rather than the experimenter, selects. The
Rickard study comes near the halfway mark of the review sample
chronology, and it is after this date that we start to see self-selected
pieces being used for locus of emotion in music studies. The
locus studies reviewed first commenced using self-selected music
from 2007 (Schubert, 2007a). Salimpoor et al. (2009) directly
compared participant-selected and experimenter-selected pieces
in their study.
Some research deliberately selected music that is unfamiliar.
In the two experiments investigating emotion locus by Dibben
(2004), she verified that the music was not familiar to any of the
participants. Hunter et al. (2010) also selected unfamiliar music
by Bach—eight selections—which were manipulated by tempo
andmode to generate the 30 stimuli presented viaMIDI playback.
Thus, music of the common practice period presented a great
range of choices for a Western-enculturated participant. Vieillard
et al. (2008) is the only study in the tabulated literature where spe-
cially composed music was created for the purpose of exerting a
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high degree of control over the stimuli. This was balanced with
some more familiar film music excerpts, used at the beginning of
the procedure. The study by Van Zijl and Sloboda (2011) used
self-selected pieces, but these were for the purpose of learning to
play—so that participants would be getting to know their stimuli
in a highly intimate way.
Two publications reviewed included no explicit musical stim-
uli (Juslin and Laukka, 2004; Zentner et al., 2008) because data
about music in general were collected via questionnaire. The
questionnaires provided critical data directly addressing the ques-
tion of locus. In this respect, they fulfilled the inclusion criteria of
this literature review because the participants were asked to think
about music in general, or a favorite piece (see also Evans and
Schubert, 2008) or genre of music. In addition, Juslin and Laukka
(2004) was one of the first published studies (along with Dibben)
to directly address the question of locus in the post-Gabrielsson
period.
When musical examples were selected, they were usually cho-
sen on the basis of which emotion they would express or evoke,
with the intention commonly being to produce a range of emo-
tions, whether based on the theory of basic emotions—such as
“joy, sadness, anger, and fear” (Kallinen and Ravaja, 2006) or a
sample from each quadrant of an emotion space (e.g., Dibben,
2004; see also Collins, 1989, though not tabulated for the present
review). For the experimental studies, the typical length of the
excerpts used ranged from 1 to 3minutes. Ali and Peynirciogˇlu
(2010) used stimuli thought to be unfamiliar, each lasting approx-
imately 20 seconds, but in one condition, participants were famil-
iarized by listening to an excerpt five times in succession. In one
of the two Ilie and Thompson (2006) studies the stimuli used had
an average duration of 6 seconds.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Many of the tabulated studies ask the participant to perform tasks
in a laboratory setting and often in groups. However, the group-
listening laboratory setting does not necessarily reflect the typical
day-to-day listening experience or environment (for a discus-
sion of the matter of naturalistic vs. experimental research, see
Mitchell, 2012). Since the emerging ubiquity of personal, private
online computer facilities, tablets andmobile phones (Krause and
Hargreaves, 2012), it has become possible to collect sophisticated
data outside the laboratory and in a private, individual environ-
ment (e.g., see Reid et al., 2009). Such technological advances will
allow locus data to be collected in a variety of settings. For exam-
ple, one of the studies outside the review epoch (Schubert, 2013)
used an online survey to collect locus data, requesting participants
to use YouTube or some other online streaming resource to lis-
ten to their self-selected pieces, and provide information about
the piece and the URL (that is, the participants pasted the link
they used to access the selected music to allow later inspection
by the researcher). The survey could be completed in private.
Further developments of this approach will be able to better ascer-
tain the reliability and validity of collecting data in such a way, as
compared to group settings with a researcher present and with
predetermined ordering of stimulus presentation.
Juslin and Laukka (2004) used a survey with nomusical stimuli
to gather data on a range of issues regarding musical experi-
ences and beliefs, including emotion perception and emotion
induction. The survey included questions about the utility of cer-
tain words for describing emotion felt and emotion expressed.
This kind of task is easy to administer and produces a rich source
of data about emotion locus. Zentner et al. (2008) also used a
survey-based approach with a direct rating for each of the two loci
for a series of 146 “feeling terms” for a variety of musical styles.
Participants first rated the terms as emotions felt for a selected
(favorite) musical style, and then again for the emotion perceived
in that style.
Indeed, one concern in the literature is the timing of the locus
tasks. Should they both be completed immediately after hearing
the musical stimulation, one after the other, or should only one
be completed (internal only or external only) in case one rating
influences the rating of the other locus? Completing the two rat-
ing items in immediate sequence has the advantage of requiring
only a single pass of the music stimulus to obtain both ratings,
but has a drawback if the participant (consciously or otherwise)
responds to the second rating item under the influence of the
first, through what is known as a “contrast” effect (Cacioppo and
Gardner, 1999; Schwarz and Strack, 1999; Cheng, 2004), where
the second response is made relative to the first, while the first
rating item response is (probably) not. For example, a high rating
of felt emotion might be exaggerated (rated even higher) if the
external locus rating is made immediately before but is also rated
as high.
Kallinen and Ravaja (2006) asked participants to rate felt emo-
tion first so as not to dilute the felt emotion caused by the delay of
rating expressed emotion first. This ordering was used in several
other tabulated experiments (e.g., Dibben, 2004; Schubert, 2007b,
Study 2 and 3; Evans and Schubert, 2008). However, Konecˇni
et al. (2008) argued that by rating external locus first (i.e., the
emotion in the music), the participant will be more cognizant
in distinguishing their own internal locus response and not con-
fuse it with the expressed emotion. They resolved the matter by
counterbalancing—half the participants made their internal locus
rating first, while the other half made their external locus rating
first. Dibben (2004; Experiment 2), Vieillard et al. (2008), and
Ali and Peynirciogˇlu (2010) each had one internal locus group
and another external locus group, each group completing ques-
tions for one locus only as a between-subjects design. Dibben
(2004) concluded that when participants make a judgment in
one locus alone, they do not differentiate between emotion and
locus as well as they do when loci are presented together (p.
111), suggesting that some “contrasting” of rating items may be
methodologically beneficial, as small differences are amplified.
Schubert (2007b) findings were different but led to a similar con-
clusion: a contrast effect was not observed, and in fact, locus tasks
performed together produced some “interference” (Gabrielsson,
2002, p. 127; Dibben, 2004, p. 95) leading to a more blended
response, compared to performing one locus task at a time. But
the same trend in response was noted when compared to the
“locus-separate” condition (recording response to one locus only,
and then the other on a second hearing of the stimulus), leading
Schubert to conclude that responding to both loci in sequence
at the same time had efficiency (almost halving experiment time,
or “doubling” the data pool, and as a result increasing statisti-
cal power), perhaps compensating for the possible disadvantages.
The recommendation of this review, then, is that it is more
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efficient to collect both locus ratings together, but to counterbal-
ance the order of loci questions, as did Konecˇni et al. (2008) when
possible. Most of the tabulated studies, when presenting the loci
responses together, requested internal locus rating first. It is not
always clear in the literature whether participants could change
their answers, though it seems that no effort was made to pre-
vent or withhold the option of checking or changing responses.
Explicit investigation of this counterbalancing is recommended.
RESPONSE FORMAT
Fifteen of the nineteen tabulated studies were defined here as
“experimental,” and for several of those, as well as the three survey
studies (see Supplementary Table 1, rows 3, 10, and 12), a wide
range of emotions were presented as entities to be rated by the
participant after listening to an extract of music, once for internal
and once for external locus. This subsection therefore examines
these item-rating response formats according to (1) the emotions
rated, (2) the number of steps available on each rating item, (3)
the number of items rated in each locus for each piece of music,
and (4) unipolar versus bipolar item labeling issues.
Emotions Rated
The most frequently used pole labels (whether rating item was
bipolar or unipolar) were happy (including happiness and very-
happy) and sad (including sadness and very sad), both used in at
least 3 eight studies (Supplementary Table 1, rows 1, 2, 4, 9, 11,
13, 14, and 16. Note: All subsequent parenthetical references to
row numbers in this subsection refer to this table, with focus on
the Measure column). In (at least) five studies an item for rating
happiness and another for rating sadness were presented (rows 1,
2, 11, 14, and 16), but on three occasions terms related to happy
and sad were presented together at the opposite poles of a sin-
gle, bipolar rating item (rows 4, 9, and 13), such as very happy
to very sad, as used by Konecˇni et al. (2008, row 9). Wording
related to “arousal/aroused” was located in four studies (rows 4,
5, 13, and 18—one of which had poles labeled “energetic/peppy”
and “bored/vegetated:” Kallinen and Ravaja, 2006, row 4). If we
group together the remaining labels according to similarity of
meanings, the next most frequently used rating item labels in the
tabulated literature are five occurrences related to anger (“angry”,
“fear”, and “scary” 4: rows 1, 2, 4, 11, and 16) and four related
to calm (“calmness”, “relax”, and “peacefulness”: rows 4, 11,
16, and 18).
3“At least” is indicated because use of the same labels in subsequent studies
with an author who had already used these labels is not, in general, added to
the count. Exceptions are made when the author has used substantially differ-
ent labels (e.g., Dibben, 2004: compare Measure column for her Experiments
1 and 2, rows 1 and 2 of Supplementary Table 1—both of these experiments
are added to the count). Furthermore, when the term happy, sad, etc. is used
to exemplify a label (such has “happy, calm, joy” to illustrate the meaning of
the label “positive emotion”), it is not included in this count. The same applies
for all summary data presented in this subsection.Where a termwas presented
in a language other than English, the English term, as reported in the target
article, is used for tallying.
4Caution is urged in making such a grouping since “fear” and “scary” are
importantly different along a dominance dimension (angry is a dominant
emotion; fear/scared are submissive). The grouping is justified only in terms
of similarity on typical valence-arousal semantic spaces (Russell, 1980).
Typically, the rating items were combined and manipulated
to create dependent variables for statistical analysis and hypoth-
esis testing. This transformation process is summarized in the
Measure column at “DV” for each of the relevant tabulated stud-
ies in Supplementary Table 1. Themost frequently used labels for
dependent variables were related to “valence” (positive, negative,
and/or valence: rows 1, 2, 4, and 18) and “arousal” (rows 4, 8,
13, and 18), although untransformed rating items also received
these labels in some studies (e.g., row 5). Thus, the emotion
constructs of valence and arousal have endured as methods of
operationalizing emotion locus response.
Number of Steps Per Rating Item
When making a response via a rating item, participants are given
a number of graded steps (points) along a continuum from which
they are to make a single selection. The range of the available
steps per rating item across the tabulated studies was from 4 to 13,
with 5-point rating items used most frequent (seven studies, rows
1, 2, 4, 10, 14, 16, and 18). Researchers have had to balance the
coarseness of completing rating items with fewer points with the
greater difficulty for the participant in making a selection when
a larger number of steps are offered (Alwin, 1997; Viswanathan
et al., 2004; Dawes, 2008). While there is no “magic number” of
rating scale steps to use, in the tabulated literature the number of
steps is generally informed by precedence (e.g., using a rating item
previously published) and the number of items to be rated—a
large number of items is usually associated with a smaller number
of steps per item, as discussed next.
Number of Emotions Rated
Konecˇni et al. (2008, row 9) deliberately used a single rating item
for each stimulus/locus combination, arguing that a large num-
ber of rating items might be unrealistic to recall and impractical
to complete in response to an excerpt of music (in accord with
Viswanathan et al., 2004). Typically 4–6 emotion item ratings
were requested per piece, per locus across the tabulated studies.
In the open-ended responses, Van Zijl and Sloboda (2011, row
19) asked performers explicitly about emotions they felt when
preparing a piece and the emotions that the music was express-
ing, meaning that there was no explicit limit to the number
of emotions that could be reported. Two of the survey stud-
ies (Juslin and Laukka, 2004; Zentner et al., 2008, rows 3 and
12) requested participants to rate how frequently a word from
a list of emotion terms was appropriate to describe music, on a
four step rating item ranging from never to always. The checklist
approach pioneered by Hevner (1936, 1937), which lists a rela-
tively large number of emotion words from which the participant
can select, is completely absent in the experimental studies tabu-
lated, suggesting utility and ease of statistical analysis of the highly
prevalent rating items.
Unipolar vs. Bipolar Rating Items
In the experimental studies, response items were most frequently
presented in a unipolar format (9 studies: rows 1, 2, 8, 11, 13,
14, 15, 16, and 18), whereas bipolar labels were used for rating
items in six studies (rows 4, 5, 6, 9, 13, and 15). Dependent vari-
ables were generated from combinations of the rated items in 9
www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 837 | 7
Schubert Emotion felt and expressed
studies, of which 4 were unipolar (rows 1, 2, 11, and 16) and 4
were bipolar (rows 4, 9, 15, and 18), with one study generating
an angular variable from the combination of arousal and valence
ratings (row 8). Some researchers converted unipolar item rat-
ings into bipolar dependent variables, such as Ilie and Thompson
(row 18), who took differences between pairs of unipolar item
ratings (e.g., “pleasant” and “unpleasant”) to generate the depen-
dent variable score (e.g., “valence”). That study is also interesting
from the point of view that it is one of the few to apply a more
contemporary model of emotion dimensions to the data, with
energy-arousal and tension-arousal scores generated, instead of
the more common “arousal” dimension alone (Schimmack and
Rainer, 2002).
The use of bipolar vs. unipolar rating items presents some
interesting challenges (Yorke, 2001). A bipolar rating item is
labeled at one pole with a term that is opposite in meaning to
the other pole to the extent possible (such as “happy” at one
end and “sad” at the other). But some researchers have found
that supposedly opposite constructs such as happy and sad or
excited and calm do not traverse from one pole to the other in
a linear, unique, proportionally exclusive manner—that is, they
are not exact opposites, do not refer to the identically oppo-
site semantic construct, and do not transition from one to the
other in a mutually exclusive manner (it is possible to feel happy
and sad at the same time). While space does not permit the
discussion of the important question of the distinction between
response item formats (see Cacioppo et al., 1997; Larsen et al.,
2001; Yorke, 2001), the semantics of rating item labels may inter-
act with interpretations of magnitude when conclusions about
locus distinctions are made. This is a crucial matter given that
negative emotion rating items (e.g., “Rate how sad” vs. “Rate
along a happy-sad bipolar continuum”) and responses to emo-
tions with putative negative emotions (e.g., a piece of a priori
angry music) are routine design matters in investigations of emo-
tion locus. The increase in experimental efficiency of collecting a
single bipolar rating item response (instead of two unipolar rating
item responses) weighed against the methodological challenges of
using bipolar ratings is an issue that has not been systematically
addressed in the emotion locus literature but may have important
ramifications.
KEY FINDING
In nine of the tabulated entries, it was possible to perform a
simple count of the number of times the mean internal locus
rating was greater than the corresponding mean external locus
rating (e.g., rating of internal locus sadness vs. rating of external
locus sadness): this is shown as a fraction in the first entry
in the Main Findings column of Supplementary Table 1. The
counts are based on the cell pairs found in the tables and figures
of the publications where direct comparisons of locus pairs were
presented. Forty-five out of 178 cell-pair comparisons were higher
for internal locus means compared to the external locus mean. If
there was no trend, 89 (50%) was the expected count, and so a
significantly small number of cases had internal locus rated higher
[χ2(1, N = 178) = 43.51,p < 0.001].Furthermore,where significant
main effects of locus were reported, external locus ratings were
rated higher than corresponding internal locus ratings in eight
analyses, and vice-versa in two analyses. On other occasions,
difference in mean locus ratings was not significantly different or
not reported.
The data from the two Ilie and Thompson studies were col-
lated and compared for the current review because those data
were designed to allow such comparison. The results reflect the
overall findings across the tabulated literature, and so are sum-
marized here. One group of participants (n = 27) rated external
locus responses in one experiment (Ilie and Thompson, 2006),
and another group (n = 64) in a separate experiment rated inter-
nal locus emotions (Ilie and Thompson, 2011; Experiment 1).
The same design and procedure as well as similar stimulusmanip-
ulations were used for both experiments with the exception of
the musical repertoire used: 5–7 seconds long baroque and clas-
sical excerpts for the 2006 study, and a single Mozart piece lasting
7minutes for the 2011 study. The stimuli were all digitally pro-
cessed to produce manipulation of pitch, tempo and intensity
(two levels for each). The comparisons of mean loci data are sum-
marized in Figure 1. The figure demonstrates the trend found
throughout the literature that felt emotions tend to be rated the
same or lower than expressed emotions for the corresponding
emotion rating and independent variable level combinations.
The use of different stimuli between locus conditions, as is the
case in this example, may raise some concerns about the valid-
ity of such a comparison, but in that case, one might expect that
either a systematic variable has led to the identified trend, or
that the number of felt mean scores would be less than the per-
ceived mean score in 50% of pairs (that is, it would be distributed
according to chance). As shown in Figure 1, two comparisons
have higher felt means than expressed mean ratings: valence rat-
ing for the soft, slow, high pitch condition—7.13 vs. 7.01, and
tension rating for the loud, fast, low pitch condition—5.25 vs.
5.22. But for each of these pairs, the (1SE) error bars overlap.
While the tabulated literature did not allow a complete, direct
statistical comparison of the relative mean magnitude of felt and
expressed locus responses, a crude comparison using error bar
overlapping was conducted, shown in the magnitude column of
Supplementary Table 1 when available or extractable (see note
for that column for more details and limitations). A count of
these crude “significance” tests revealed that overall there were
99 cases where mean felt emotions were rated as lower in mag-
nitude (regardless of the emotion rated) than the mean expressed
rating (for the corresponding emotion rating item), but only nine
occasions where the reverse was the case (mean expressed mag-
nitude lower than mean felt magnitude). In 77 tests, error bars
between mean locus pairs overlapped, suggesting a relatively high
proportion of cases where participants rank emotions as being
well matched in magnitude across locus.
In one of the two studies where mean internal locus was rated
as higher than mean external locus, it was valence that exhibited
a main effect, with mean felt emotions rated as above zero, and
mean expressed emotions as below zero (Kallinen and Ravaja,
2006). In the same study, a secondmain effect was reported where
negative activation ratings were also rated in this order across loci.
Furthermore, an interaction was identified for the valence score,
where pieces that were expected to represent negative emotions
(fear and sadness) were rated with higher felt negative emotions
than expressed negative emotions (see Main Findings column in
Supplementary Table 1, row 4). The second study where mean
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FIGURE 1 | Collation of data from two experiments (Ilie and
Thompson, 2006, 2011, Experiment 1) comparing external and
internal locus results across the combinations of independent
variables—intensity (loud, soft), rate (fast, slow) and pitch (high, low)
for each of three dependent variables (valence, energy arousal and
tension arousal) which were formed from combinations of two
five-point (0–4) unipolar rating items hence a range of 0–8. Error bars
indicate ±1 SE.
internal locus was rated as higher than the mean external locus
(Vieillard et al., 2008) produced an overall main effect of higher
rating for felt than expressed emotion, using the “best label” score
approach.
Apart from these two studies, the overwhelming evidence
presented in Supplementary Table 1 is that when emotion loci
are not statistically the same, emotion felt is rated lower than
emotion expressed by the music—for example, higher positive
expressed emotion than positive felt emotion (Dibben, 2004;
Schubert, 2007b; Konecˇni et al., 2008; Zentner et al., 2008; Ali and
Peynirciogˇlu, 2010; Hunter et al., 2010). The study by Salimpoor
et al. (2009) provides evidence that when there is a difference in
mean locus rating, the difference is constituted as felt emotion
being lower, rather than expressed emotion being higher. This
evidence is drawn from the comparison of music selection condi-
tion results: in the self-selected condition both felt and expressed
emotions were rated with a statistically equal mean of about 7 on
a pleasure scale of 1 (neutral) to 10 (extremely pleasurable), but
in the experimenter music-selected condition, felt emotions rat-
ings dropped to four while expressed emotion ratings remained
at around seven.
Across the tabulated literature a number of interacting vari-
ables were investigated to see what other influences bear on locus
response, including physiological state, personality, age, music-
selection responsibility (participant or experimenter), musical
features and, as already described above, the putative emotional
connotation expected in themusic—for example, when themusic
is expected to represent negative emotion. Some studies reported
relationships between interacting variables and the gap across
emotion loci (“GAEL,” the difference between the internal and
external locus scores, usually reported as an absolute value). With
regard to personality differences, participants exhibiting high
scores in trait neuroticism-anxiety and on a scale measuring the
behavioral inhibition system (“BIS”, the system that specializes in
dealing with aversive signals) responded statistically with a larger
GAEL score than did those scoring low in neurotic-anxiety and
BIS (Kallinen and Ravaja, 2006). Kallinen and Rajava argued that
high neurotic-anxiety participants suppressed emotional expe-
riences more than their extraverted counterparts (p. 195). In
the Salimpoor et al. study, the method of stimulus selection
mattered, with participant-selected music producing more equal
ratings across loci (smaller GAEL) than experimenter-selected
ratings (Salimpoor et al., 2009). Furthermore, the statistically
equal ratings between felt and expressed emotion are found
when liked music is used, compared to disliked music (Schubert,
2007a, 2010). This is consistent with Salimpoor et al. because
the self-selected pieces were presumably liked more than the
experimenter-selected pieces in that study.
Hunter et al. (2010) identified interactions between loci and
each of the musical feature variable manipulations investigated—
tempo and mode—for their specially manipulated stimuli. While
they found the overall lower emotion ratings for internal com-
pared to external locus conditions, happiness ratings amplified
this difference when the tempo was fast, and sadness ratings
amplified this GAEL when tempo was slow (for a summary
of other interactions in this study, see Main Findings column
of Supplementary Table 1, row 14). Schubert (2007a) reported
systematic differences in locus due to preference, with lovedmusic
producing a close match between locus scores (small GAEL),
a result that was replicated (Schubert, 2010), albeit with fairly
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marginal significance (p = 0.045—see Supplementary Table 1,
row 15).
Apart from a main effect of internal locus emotions being
rated lower than external locus emotions under many condi-
tions, few of the additional independent variables investigated in
the tabulated literature have produced consistent responses, most
importantly because of a lack of replication. The most commonly
repeated investigated interaction across the tabulated studies is
the putative emotion of the musical stimuli. But, as mentioned
above, the results are not altogether consistent across studies, and
furthermore, there are different ways of collecting emotion rat-
ings (e.g., different ways of labeling of the rating items—see dis-
cussion under Response Format, above), transforming those data
into dependent variables, and the nature of the musical stimuli.
The clearest, new trend, then, that has emerged in the lit-
erature since Gabrielsson’s review is that when there is a mis-
match between felt and expressed emotion, and when these data
are gathered via rating items (as distinct from selection of dis-
crete emotions: see Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2011), results rarely
show that felt emotions are rated as statistically higher than
expressed emotions. As a consequence, the next section of this
review focuses on building theory that explains this finding about
emotion locus in music.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
FELT EMOTION LESS THAN EXPRESSED: EMOTIONAL CONTAGION
THEORY
As an extension of Gabrielsson’s thinking described in the open-
ing of this paper, it could be assumed that there is no differentia-
tion between the conceptualization of internal and external loci of
emotion: it is all part of the same emotional response, and being
asked to make the distinction may even be considered artificial.
But the findings of the literature reviewed, and in particular the
explicit investigation by Juslin and Laukka (2004), demonstrate
that a majority of people can make distinctions between these
perspectives, understanding that music can appear to express an
emotion and that the emotion can be felt. External and internal
loci do not necessarily meld into the one experience, at least not
for the wide majority of the participants in the Juslin and Laukka
study. Even if this distinction is a purely artificial or cultural
one, it appears to be widely present and is in need of theoretical
understanding.
However, the reason for the quantitatively different rating
between loci found in the tabulated literature, when it occurs,
could be something as basic as the instructions. Konecˇni (2008)
demonstrated that the wording and detail of the task can impose a
secondary influence on the results. He revealed different amounts
of detail about a publication on music and emotion and asked
the participants to determine which locus the paper was refer-
ring to at the different stages. The locus indicated in the article
was external and revealed in the title (“. . . perceived intensity
of emotion”) 5. In Konecˇni’s study, only 25% of participants
5Reading only the title of the article produced the greatest confusion in par-
ticipant belief about the target locus of the article. However, this might not be
so unreasonable given the ambiguity of the term “perceived”, particularly in
the absence of the grammatical subject of the sentence, discussed earlier, and
summarized in Table 1.
identified the correct locus, suggesting they tend to think in terms
of their own feelings when there is “ambiguity” in wording. The
Konecˇni study demonstrates the importance of clarity of commu-
nication. But a theoretically interesting question is why such bias
in interpretation may be present.
To explain locus relationships, Evans and Schubert (2008)
drew on the distinction made between absolutism and refer-
entialism in the experience of music, as proposed by Meyer
(1956) and reinterpreted by Schubert and McPherson (2006).
Referentialism suggests that connections between music, emo-
tions, and other situations/events are made by association pri-
marily as a result of life experiences and cultural knowledge but
also through highly individual and even idiosyncratic connec-
tions. A mismatch in musical emotion and felt emotion can be
explained by these kinds of idiosyncratic, arbitrary pairings, as
Gabrielsson (2002) points out. Schubert and McPherson then
proposed that meaning can also be encoded more directly into
the music (as according to Meyer’s account of absolutism, or
“absolute-expressionism”), where emotions are directly decoded
by the listener [an idea found in the “lens model” proposed by
Juslin (1997); Juslin and Lindström (2010)] through an act of
mimicry, and neurophysiologically via the mirror neuron mech-
anism (Schubert, 2007b). An influential, related explanation was
proposed by Juslin and Västfjäll (2008), who labeled this kind of
process as “emotion contagion.” In other words, emotional con-
tagion is the direct influence upon the listener of the emotion
that the music portrays, in the absence of outside “interference”
through, for example, idiosyncratic connections—such as the
unhappy break-up with a partner when otherwise happy music
is playing (“referentialism” according to Evans and Schubert,
and “episodic memory” according to Juslin and Västfjäll).
Emotional contagion may then be taken as one theoretical
position for understanding relationships between emotion loci
in music.
Put simply, emotional contagion in music refers to the trans-
mission of an emotion via the auditory sense alone. Bharucha
et al. (2006) explain:
Unlike other types of contagions, the germs of emotion trans-
mitted by music seem to require no social interaction—musical
emotions are airborne contagions. The social contagion of emo-
tions is thought to stem from the tendency to automatically mimic
the social cues of others, such as body posture, movement, facial
expressions, and vocal expressions. It is perhaps the latter that
leads to social contagion in music. (p. 156)
Several of the reviewed studies (Gabrielsson, 2002; Dibben, 2004;
Kallinen and Ravaja, 2006; Ali and Peynirciogˇlu, 2010; Schubert,
2010) refer to the possible role of social inhibition and the
laboratory setting. Under such circumstances, strong emotional
outbursts can be considered inappropriate, leading participants to
suppress felt emotional response relative to external locus rating.
By adopting an emotional contagion framework, what this means
theoretically is that inhibition of experienced emotion can take
place when making internal locus responses. Evidence from non-
music literature about social inhibition and its influence on felt
emotion can be found in the within-internal-locus distinctions
identified in social psychology where public displays of emotions
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do not identically map onto actually felt emotions (Bono and
Vey, 2005; Mann, 2005; Bakker and Heuven, 2006; Langer et al.,
2007; Manne et al., 2007; see also discussion in Limitation 5,
above). However, further investigation will be required to exam-
ine whether this kind of social, contextual adjustment of felt
emotion occurs in response to music.
If we apply contagion theory to explain emotion locus rela-
tionships in music perception, that expressed emotions are trans-
mitted to (or infect) the listener, then we can explain inhibition as
a plausible explanation for reduced felt ratings, and the inhibition
may be a product of social context. Evidence from a study where
internal locus emotions were rated in response to various emo-
tion expressing film excerpts (Jakobs et al., 2001) suggests there is
an influence of social context. When a film extract was viewed
alone, felt sadness ratings were higher than when viewed with
another person (see also Raghunathan and Corfman, 2006; and
for a similar design, but using music stimuli, see Liljeström et al.,
2012).
FELT EMOTION MORE VARIED THAN EXPRESSED: DECODING THEORY
AND THE LENS MODEL
A further complication of the locus relationship debate is the
variability in responses to either locus. If the properties of the
artwork—in this case, the relationships among musical features
over time—are consistent upon repeated exposures, then it may
seem logical to assume that the emotion expressed by that stim-
ulus is also stable, and it is the internal locus that might be
more variable, depending, for example, on the mood of the lis-
tener/perceiver, as Gabrielsson points out in the “zero correlation”
case of his “no-systematic relation” (Gabrielsson, 2002 p. 136).
Juslin’s lens model, discussed above, can be used to help interpret
this situation. If a performer and/or composer encodes particu-
lar emotions into a piece of music, the listener’s decoding will to
some extent be a statistical process, meaning that decoding will
not necessarily be the same as the encoded emotion. Felt emotion
may be characterized as “encoded emotion plus noise.” Schubert
(2007b – see Supplementary Table 1, row 5) tested this explicitly
by comparing the variance for each emotion rating pair across loci
to assess the “stability” of the loci, arguing that if one locus had a
lower variance than the other, it was more stable. Six F-tests out
of 20 (4 emotions rated × 5 pieces of music) were significant at
p = 0.05, with felt emotions demonstrating larger variance than
expressed emotions, with three of these being in response to one
piece, “Jupiter” from The Planets by Holst (for ratings of emo-
tional strength, arousal and valence). One out of 20 may have
been significant by chance alone, and so the study concluded
that expressed emotions are overall more stable than felt. It sug-
gests that when all things are equal, internal locus equals external
locus plus noise, a claim that requires more research (Schubert,
submitted).
Thus, the theoretical underpinning of emotional contagion
has not yet been fully addressed in the current literature of emo-
tion locus for music. Further studies will need to falsify the idea
that felt emotion is lower in absolute magnitude than expressed
emotion because of inhibited contagion, and whether there is
a systematic difference in variance between the two loci. Cases
of felt emotion being greater than expressed will need to be
better explained from a theoretical stance before the inhibited
contagion account can be fully supported. I will examine one
further theoretical position that is able to explain some of the
results identified in the tabulated studies.
MIXED RESPONSES: DISSOCIATION THEORY
I am not explicitly concerned in this review with research on
music expressing conflicting emotions, such as happy and sad
emotions, at the same time (Hunter et al., 2008, 2010). But
peculiar to the locus debate is when a complex combination of
emotion matches and non-matches occur between and within
loci, such as music expressing fear but the listener reacts with feel-
ings of embarrassment and joy. Let us suppose now that the joyful
reaction was due to the memory that the music evokes about
something quite personal and private (as per the “episodic mem-
ory mechanism” proposed by Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008), and that
upon realizing the response was possibly inappropriate in the cur-
rent setting (e.g., the music was heard in a concert setting where
the other audience members were quiet and calm), the listener
became embarrassed. Thus, three potentially mismatching emo-
tions are at play here—one the fear expressed by the music, and
the two felt emotions (embarrassment and joy).
After the work of Charland and Colombetti (Charland, 2005;
Colombetti, 2005), I (Schubert, 2012, 2013) proposed a solu-
tion to the conundrum of mixed emotions in music by arguing
that there are two qualitatively different kinds of “feeling” (to use
the term in a way similar to Zentner et al., 2008) experiences:
emotion valence and affect valence. Emotion valence is specific
to emotional contemplation, without any necessary approach or
withdrawal action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989). Affect valence,
on the other hand, is concerned with the action/evaluative
response qualities, which can generally be thought of as pref-
erences (including enjoyment, liking and attraction, or lack
thereof). Affect valence is the outcome of the music-listening
activity and therefore, also encompasses the more powerful aes-
thetic responses to music, such as awe, spirituality and being
moved (Kivy, 1990, 1999; Konecˇni, 2005). In the example, the
listener was experiencing the positive emotion valence of joy
(internal locus) but then had a negative affect evaluation of
embarrassment. The Van Zijl and Sloboda study (2011, see quote
in Supplementary Table 1, row 19, Main Findings) further exem-
plifies this separation through the felt emotion in response to the
utilitarian task of learning the piece (affect valence: frustration,
remain calm) and the emotion valence experienced in response to
the music (e.g., again from the quote in Supplementary Table 1,
peaceful, happy).
The separation of affect valence and emotion valence, although
at times non-trivial, is proposed as a way of resolving previ-
ous confusion in the literature about some “mixed” emotional
responses (an additional example is provided in Table 2). Simple
preference (liking, loving, hating) is a typical example of affect
valence found in the literature.
The affect/emotion valence distinction is explained from the
cognitive theoretical standpoint of dissociation theory, where
when listening to music we are usually in a state where we “switch
off” pain circuits6, meaning that we can enjoy negative emotions
6The term “circuits” is used here in a cognitive psychology, metaphorical
context, rather than in a literal neuroscience way.
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Table 2 | Revision of Gabrielsson’s relationships between felt and expressed emotion loci in music.
Relationship Example Possible mechanism/theory Notes
1. Matched relationships Contagion Same as Gabrielsson’s “positive” relationship.
• positive to positive The happy music makes
me feel happy.
Contagion
• negative to negative The sad music makes
me feel sad.
Contagion
2. Unmatched relationships
• positive to non-positive
• non-positive to positive
• negative to non-negative
• non-negative to negative
The music is happy but
makes me feel sad.
Episodic memory/Evaluative
conditioning/Referentialism
Presented as a broader alternative to Gabrielsson’s
“negative”/“opposite,” encompassing any non-matching
emotion/affect.
3. Complex/Mixed The music expresses
several emotions/I feel
several emotions, some
different from the music.
Dissociation/several This optional category can be reduced to simultaneously
multiple occurrences of matched and/or unmatched
relationships.
4. Interesting
Subcategories, (classified
within category 1, 2 or 3
above)
a. Felt level magnitude The music expresses a
lot of sadness, but I only
feel a little bit sad.
Inhibited contagion/partial
Dissociation
Reflects the common finding that could be a result of
inhibited or incomplete contagion, and/or partial
dissociation.
b. Affect/emotion blend The music expresses
grief, and it makes me
feel a sense of sadness
but also a sense of awe.
Contagion + Dissociation Music expresses an emotion (in the example, it is a
negative emotion valence), but, in the example, the listener
feels sadness (possible matching, and a negative valence
emotion), as well as a positive affect valence (awe). This is a
subcategory of either matched and/or unmatched
relationships. The example suggests both (or Complex)
c. Differential variance
across loci
Felt emotion ratings
more varied than
expressed emotion
ratings
Contagion, Decoding theory Contagion occurs, but decoding of emotion occurs with
statistical noise (as suggested by the Lens model), which
might be explained, for example, by the mood of the
listener, their cultural immersion and their familiarity with
the style of the music.
without the unpleasant negative affect valence (Schubert, 1996,
2009–2010). In the example above, the embarrassed (negative
affect valence) response meant that the individual was not in
a dissociated state and could, as a result, not (or no longer)
enjoy the music that, in another context, he or she may have
liked very much (positive affect valence). Recent classifications
of descriptive adjectives have started to separate groups of terms
in ways compatible with dissociation theory. For example, Juslin
and Laukka (2004) propose that some emotions are more suitable
for inducing in the listener, while others are more apt for being
expressed by the music. Being moved, amazed, or enchanted are
presented as examples of induced (but not expressed) emotions.
By revising the way affect qualities are conceptualized, these may
be understood as unique to induction (rather than expression)
because they are affect valences (rather than emotion valences).
Being moved might be a result of feeling sad, or happy (emotion
valence), or some other experience(s) which led to the affective
response of being moved.
My point is that by differentiating (dissociating) between emo-
tion valence and affect valence, affect/emotion blends can be
more simply understood than the otherwise complex responses
we appear to have to music. “The music makes me sad, and that
gives me pleasure” suggests a negative emotion valence of sad-
ness, but a positive affect valence of pleasure. There is no need
to view sadness and pleasure as conflicting. From a theoretical
stance, the pleasure indicates that the listener is in a dissociated
state, meaning that negative valence affects are inhibited, and
so all emotions (negative and positive) can be enjoyed. Zentner
et al. (2008) present a statistically determined grouping of music
evoked adjectives, producing nine clusters of word groups, two
of which—“wonder” and “transcendence”—actually fit well with
the affect valence concept (with terms such as “amazed”, “moved”,
feeling of “spirituality”), while the other clusters indicate adjec-
tives more representative of emotion valence. However, terms
such as “irritated” (part of the “tension” cluster) are more typ-
ically concerned with affect valence—being irritated by a piece
of music is a reason that the listener might stop listening, rather
than experience as an emotion that she or he can contemplate
(Schubert, 2013). Dissociation theory may provide a solution to
one of the enduring debates on emotion locus and whether there
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exists a special set of aesthetic or musical emotions that are acti-
vated only when an artistic (musical) activity or thought takes
place, distinct from utilitarian emotions experienced in every-
day life (for further discussion, see Kivy, 1989; Krumhansl, 1997;
Pouivet, 2000; Khalfa et al., 2002; Krumhansl, 2002; Scherer, 2005;
Silvia and Brown, 2007; Silvia, 2009; Barrett et al., 2010; Peretz,
2010; Perlovsky, 2010; Juslin, 2011; Juslin et al., 2011; Chan et al.,
2013; Juslin, 2013).
REVISION OF GABRIELSSON’S LOCUS RELATIONSHIPS
Gabrielsson’s categories of emotion locus relationships have pro-
vided an important framework for encouraging direct engage-
ment with and awareness of the question of emotion locus
in music. The current review suggests that the categories may
be reworked and calibrated to reflect the current distinctions
between loci of which the research community is now aware.
Table 2 summarizes the revised relationships and reports possi-
ble explanatory mechanisms (Juslin, 1997; Juslin and Västfjäll,
2008; Schubert, 2007b, 2009–2010). Reworded are the terms
“positive” vs. “negative” (or “opposite”) relationships—now
“matched” vs. “unmatched,” respectively to reserve the former
terms for the conventional use of emotion and affect valence (pos-
itive/negative). “No systematic relationship” has been absorbed
into “unmatched” to reflect the non-matching nature of emotion
pairs that are neither “opposite” nor “positive” (referred to as con-
trapositive by Evans and Schubert, 2006), such as sad and excited,
not just those that are directly “opposite” on an emotion-space
geometry (such as sad and happy).
If we eliminate the no-systematic relationship category in
those cases when it is due to instability of responses over time,
or those that do not concern emotional relationships between
expressed and felt emotions on any occasions (no systematic
relationship, and no relationship), we end upwith two broad cate-
gories: matched vs. unmatched relationships. The omission of the
non-systematic and no relationships are justified by two findings
(1) when no emotion is reported in both the felt and expressed
loci, the categorization becomes irrelevant (see, e.g., Sloboda and
Juslin, 2010, p. 83)—the participantmay be having formalist, cog-
nitive or no responses to the music, but without emotion, and
(2) no emotion in one locus and some emotion, or even none,
in another can be subsumed by the unmatched emotion locus
relationship.
The proposed scheme attempts to revise Gabrielsson’s set
of relationships to bring them into line with the current state
of research on emotion locus in music. The theoretical orga-
nizing principle of the revision is based on our understand-
ing, assumptions, and limitations of the emotional contagion
processes, and its interactions with a dissociation mechanism and
the Lens model inspired decoding theory, discussed above.
Thus, in the revised format two main categories of relation-
ships are proposed:matched and unmatched, referring to whether
the expressed emotion is reflected in the felt emotion. A third
main category of relationships is included, which is referred to as
complex/mixed relationships to account for the possibility of both
matched and/or unmatched relationships occurring at the same
time. This category is reducible to matched and/or unmatched
relationships occurring multiple times and/or simultaneously,
and so the complex/mixed relationship is provided for complete-
ness rather than necessity. Furthermore, this category allows for
convenient discussion of the interesting area of research concern-
ing mixed emotions portrayed and evoked by music (Evans and
Schubert, 2008; Hunter et al., 2008, 2010; Barrett et al., 2010;
Juslin, 2011; Juslin et al., 2011).
Subcategories can be attached to the twomain categories based
on the valence of the relations (for matched, positive [expressed]
to positive [felt] or negative to negative, and for unmatched, posi-
tive to negative and vice versa—see Table 2). The key issue here is
the position of the boundary delineating matched vs. unmatched
emotion pairs. For magnitude comparisons of the same emo-
tion variable (e.g., rating happiness on a 1–10 continuum for felt
and expressed emotion), conventional inferential statistical pro-
cedures can be used to determine matched (no difference) or
unmatched (different) loci. However, for discrete emotion words,
or when emotions are plotted on an affect grid (Russell, 1980;
Russell et al., 1989b), the analysis can be more involved. For
example, in some contexts it might be sufficient to refer to a
calm emotion expressed as being matched with a happy emo-
tion felt. The current taxonomy does not explicitly dictate where
the boundary between a matched vs. unmatched emotion pair
lies—e.g., whether “happy” and “calm” are matched emotions or
not. Furthermore, for discrete emotion words the boundary may
be fuzzy or ill-defined. Evans and Schubert (2008) developed a
criterion using Euclidean distance between valence (x-axis) and
arousal (y-axis) (assuming the two variables to be orthogonal as
per Russell, 1979, 1980), and selected a (more or less arbitrary, but
conservative) angle in the space about which to identify whether
a pair of emotions are matched vs. unmatched. After some exper-
imentation, they selected an angle of 45◦ in the polar coordinate
system within which the emotions were classified as matched. A
“within same quadrant” (in a two-dimensional emotion space)
approach is also a plausible, though less conservative, approach.
If this geometric approach to differentiating matched vs.
unmatched emotions continues to be adopted, then it would be
interesting to see if this empirically determined boundary angle
could be reproduced in such a way as to group qualitatively simi-
lar emotions together, such as applying inferential statistical tests
to subtended angles (Mardia and Jupp, 2000). In practice, it is
unlikely that such boundaries will be fixed and stable given that a
single emotion does not necessarily occupy the same location on
an emotion-space, because there exists some fluidity of meaning
within and across individuals and cultures (Russell et al., 1989a;
Schubert, 1999). Furthermore, investigation of locus relationships
using discrete emotions is in need of further attention, because
nearly all of the tabulated studies used rating items, reflecting
an interest in magnitude of emotion rather than the semantic
distinctions of Russell’s “circumplex” model of emotion.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Gabrielsson’s rediscovery and systematic organization of the rela-
tionships between felt and perceived emotion during a musical
experience can be considered significantly responsible for open-
ing up a new topic of music psychology and in regard to emotion
research in general because it brought to focus the distinction
between the locus of emotion when the reactions are not between
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two sentient beings, but between one sentient being and a piece
of music. This review identified the key issues that have emerged
in subsequent years and proposed three cognitive based theoret-
ical frameworks to help focus further research. The theories of
emotional contagion, decoding and dissociation were presented.
Emotional contagion explains why we tend to feel the emo-
tion that music is conveying. Through the inhibition of this felt
emotion, we feel emotion at a lower magnitude than the corre-
sponding expressed emotion. This “inhibited-contagion” account
will need more research to determine why there would then be
any situations when felt emotions were rated as stronger (in
magnitude) than expressed emotions. According to the inhib-
ited contagion account, these situations should not occur, but
they do (albeit relatively infrequently in the studies reviewed).
Furthermore, is inhibited-contagion a satisfactory explanation for
unmatched emotions across loci when the emotions are discrete
(such as happy, sad, angry, calm)? And does the related idea of
decoding theory mean that internal locus will have more vari-
ability than external locus? Such a view needs to account for the
question of whether the judgment of an observed object (or piece
of music) is really sensed in a fixed, stable way by the perceiver
(for philosophical views on this matter, see Townsend, 1987).
That is, contagion theory has the implication that it is possible
to objectively “know” the external locus emotions, for example
through examination of musical features. However, external locus
of emotionmust also be simulated by the perceiver—for example,
illusions demonstrate that the thought-to-be-observed object is
not always isomorphic with the physical stimulus (Coren and
Girgus, 1978)—and this is a view that has not been tested in the
tabulated literature, even though it is important in philosophi-
cal aesthetics and is attracting interest in neuroscientific research
(e.g., Sevdalis and Keller, 2009; Novembre et al., 2012).
Dissociation theory attempts to address confusion in simul-
taneously differential responses to music within locus—such
as experiencing high preference for music that makes that lis-
tener feel sad (both internal-locus responses). This theory allows
researchers to understand that different, apparently conflicting
feelings can be experienced at the same time, without having to
dogmatically attribute them to one or the other locus of emotion
(e.g., the music is sad, and I like that). Contagion and dissoci-
ation principles may work hand in hand in the perception of
music: under normal, real-life, day-to-day circumstances it might
be undesirable and even dangerous to acquire emotion solely
through contagion transfer (e.g., feeling angry when someone else
is angry—experiencing fear might be more adaptive. See Preston
and De Waal, 2002, who also provide a neuroscientific explana-
tion of inhibited contagion). That is, the individual experiences
“utilitarian” rather than “aesthetic” emotions (Scherer, 2004).
The day-to-day circumstance is one where emotion valence and
affect valence are not dissociated, allowing adaptive responses
(the anger leads to a negative affect valence). In music listen-
ing and other aesthetic contexts, dissociation of emotion valence
from affect valence allows contagion to operate unhindered by
day-to-day, utilitarian circumstances and can be enjoyed. In other
words, according to dissociation theory, affect valence is always
positive in an aesthetic context. The context is the cause of the
dissociation between emotion valence and affect valence.
Preference being higher when internal and external loci are
matched also requires further investigation. It could be that pref-
erence can be implicitly measured by how well the two loci are
matched—that is, the smaller that gap across emotion loci, the
greater the preference. But determining the causal chain will be
of interest, too—whether the preference causes the locus to be
different, whether the difference in locus causes preference to
change, or whether some other variables are involved. Another
interesting research question is whichmechanism can explain this
finding. Dissociation theory and contagion theory can explain the
preference through the activation (which is pleasurable) of conta-
gion circuits. Contagion circuits are the same or related to mirror
circuits (e.g., Koelsch et al., 2006) and to the positive affects
of empathy. But the nature of those circuits, as applied to the
proposed cognitive theoretical frameworks, is in need of further
investigation. For example, no studies have explicitly attempted
to examine whether neural pathways for processing felt emo-
tion might be different from the neural pathways for processing
expressed emotions (e.g., see Blood and Zatorre, 2001; Peretz
et al., 2004; Menon and Levitin, 2005; Brattico et al., 2009).
Contagion-circuit theory assumes both loci have shared path-
ways (Preston and De Waal, 2002), but none of the data reported
explicitly aims to test this assertion.
Trait and personality effects, including behavioral inhibi-
tion/activation systems (Kallinen and Ravaja, 2006), absorption
(Kreutz et al., 2008a; Garrido and Schubert, 2011a; Herbert,
2011), rumination (Garrido and Schubert, 2013; Wilhelm et al.,
2013) and so on (e.g., Rentfrow andGosling, 2003; Rentfrow et al.,
2011), may each impact the way individuals differ in their felt
and perceived judgments of music, but apart from Kallinen and
Ravaja, little attention has been given to the effect of trait upon
emotion locus. Psychological, physical and physiological states
may also influence emotion loci relationships in music, but only a
single study has examined this in the tabulated literature (Dibben,
2004, see Supplementary Table 1, rows 1 and 2).
The wide range of task wordings may be in need of some
standardization, with the name of the locus variable producing
little agreement across studies and therefore unnecessary confu-
sion (for example, when performing a database search on the
topic). While the wording of the levels within the locus vari-
able can be quite flexible, Konecˇni (2008) demonstrated that
the wording and detail of the task can also affect the results.
Furthermore, the reader needs to be clear on the grammatical
subject of the locus level (the music expresses and the listener
perceives external locus emotion). More consistency in the label-
ing used to describe the variable in question is urged. In this
review, the term “locus of emotion” or “emotion locus” has been
adopted.
The present review calls for a firmer theoretical stance to help
direct future research. Interestingly, one of the rarely cited, early
writers on the locus relationship had a premonition of a use-
ful theoretical framework for understanding emotion locus in
music, with Vernon Lee’s idea of “sympathetic imitation,” which
in contemporary literature resembles emotional contagion—the
dominant theoretical framework that provides a basis for explain-
ing a large portion of the results of the literature investigated in
this review.
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science December 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 837 | 14
Schubert Emotion felt and expressed
Finally, based on an examination of the literature published
in the decade after Gabrielsson’s seminal work, some rear-
rangements and suggestions have been made that may assist
future researchers investigating relationships between emotion
expressed by music and emotion felt by the listener in response
to music. The data examined and newly arising findings were
used to rearrange Gabrielsson’s categorization. Reflecting the
growing interest in explaining why emotion ratings are different
across locus in certain situations, the simplifying nomenclature
of “matched” vs. “unmatched” emotion pairs across loci were
used in this review as the basis of formulating locus relation-
ships. There is much work to be done in understanding locus
relationships, and this review, if successful, should soon become
an interim report on the state of the art in the locus of emotion in
music.
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